

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 005014

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA (MBITTRICK) AND PM/PPA (RFEATHERSTONE)  
DOD FOR USDP (BRZEZINSKI AND WHALEN)  
PASS USAID FOR DCHA AND AFRICA BUREAU  
PASS USUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2014

TAGS: [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [SU](#) [EUN](#) [USEU](#) [BRUSSELS](#)

SUBJECT: EU MILITARY COMMITTEE ADVICE ON THE AU MISSION IN  
DARFUR

Classified By: USEU political military officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary. USEU was passed the text of the European Union Military Committee's military advice to the Political and Security Committee on the AU Plan for the AMIS II mission in Darfur. It was likely passed with the intention to influence, as well as inform. The Military Committee finds significant risks for the operation and concludes that some of the AU's assumptions are unrealistic. They express concern that the AU has shifted away from its original planning as the result of "uncoordinated donor action" and political pressure for rapid action. End summary.

-----  
Excerpts  
-----

2. (C) Begin salient portions of text from the European Union Military Committee Advice. Internal paragraph numbering does not reflect the original text:

3. (C) The EU Military Committee considers that in general, the plan is realistic and structured and constitutes a significant improvement to the current mission. It introduces a more proactive monitoring approach and there is a clear intention for the early deployment of additional MILOBS. It takes a positive view on a liaison with non-AU organizations in particular the UN. Furthermore, the intention to include a police component as an integrated element of AMIS II demonstrates recognition of the need to take a comprehensive approach to improving security conditions. Overall it is the EUMC opinion that the plan would contribute to the achievement of the political aim, "to assist the parties to reach a political settlement in Darfur, contributing to a stable, peaceful and united Sudan."

4. (C) The plan hinges on the assumption that all parties will comply with the HCFA and therefore implies that violations of the HCFA would be isolated and sporadic rather than structural. The Government of Sudan (GoS) has primary responsibility for the protection of its civilians. Furthermore, and of equal importance, there is an underlying assumption that the GoS is capable of, and willing to exercise appropriate control over armed militias and Janjaweed who are not signatories to the HCFA. The EUMC considers that these underpinning assumptions are not supported by a threat assessment of the situation and consequently that the plan carries a high level of risk.

5. (C) The EUMC considers that in general terms the military mission supports the political intent and the mandate for AMIS II. It is clear that AMIS II is not mandated to enforce compliance. Certain tasks ("match threat levels as well as demonstrating an increased military presence where necessary.") would seem to go beyond what was originally intended in the mandate. The non-availability of ROEs however does not allow assessment of this question. The current formulation of protection tasks, albeit contingent upon means and capabilities, will undoubtedly create expectations which cannot be met by a force the size of AMIS II in an area the size of France. The EUMC therefore is concerned that AU Protection Elements operating beyond the mandate could be drawn into "enforcement" operations for which they are neither prepared nor equipped.

6. (C) The expansion will lead to a new force consisting of some 530 MILOBS out of whom 450 will be working in operational observing teams. The ratio between the actual number of MILOBS and the Protection Element is 450:1703 (1:4). Although it is understood that this ratio has been largely based on UN experience of peacekeeping operations elsewhere, the EUMC has difficulties to estimate if this ratio is sufficient for success due to absence of a risk assessment and the size of the Area of Operations.

7. (C) The EUMC is concerned that command relationship between the MILOBS teams and the Protection Element is not clear. Both are (under the local tactical control of) their respective Sector Commanders, however it is not clear who

decides on actions where operations need to be conducted across sector boundaries. The EUMC believes that in addition to creating command and control complexities and increasing overall levels of risk, the limited presence of EU and US observers could have an impact on rebel parties acceptance of the expanded mission.

18. (C) Although the plan provides and Exit Strategy, this focuses on the political/strategic End State. The EUMC considers the criteria for success very ambitious, which could result in a mission of long duration. Furthermore, the plan does not provide a military end state, just some benchmarks for the Military Component. The EUMC notes that the plan does not provide for a periodic Mission Review process that could measure the progress towards the desired End State.

19. (C) Although the possibility for deterioration of the situation is not excluded, the EUMC notes the absence of the mechanisms for possible evacuation of MILOBS and Protection Elements.

#### ----- Factual Evolution of the Implementation -----

10. (C) The plan under assessment is the written plan that was briefed to the AU Military Staff Committee and subsequently the AU PSC. However, a different plan has been subsequently implemented, according to the EUMC's information, partially as a result of uncoordinated donor action and political pressure for rapid action. The principles that underpinned the initial plan developed by the Technical Assistance Group:

- operational and logistic enablers in place prior to deployment
- sufficient staff at all levels
- priority to deployment of additional MILOBS
- adequate force protection

have been set aside. Although the revised plan retains the political intent, military mission and mandate of the original plan, the implementation and timelines are significantly altered.

11. (C) The scheme for the expansion of AMIS that initially foresaw 5 phases was accelerated and condensed concentration on the deployment of Protection Elements with little regard to what they might be able to accomplish once deployed. As a consequence, troops are now being deployed to staging areas. Follow-on deployment to final destinations is delayed by the lack of adequate infrastructure and facilities at the final destinations. This leads to congestion at the staging areas and possibly to the perception of mismanagement of the operation and idling troops in the public eye. The current focus on deploying the Protection Element without the MILOBS does not directly contribute to the intent of AMIS II ("to strengthen the monitoring capacity of the AMIS to a level where it conducts pro-active monitoring and through political and diplomatic means increase the level of compliance of the Parties to the HCFA thus discouraging attacks on civilians").

12. (C) Many of the pre-conditions detailed in the first deployment phases of the original plan have yet to be met thus increasing levels of risks. The TAG brought this issue to the attention of the AU in writing when plans were amended. The continuing absence of a capable AU planning capacity at all levels (the DITF in Addis, the Mission HQ in Khartoum and the Force HQ in El Fashir), coupled with a continuing reluctance to accept international planning support remain primary concerns.

#### ----- Conclusions -----

13. (C) Following the analysis, the EUMC concludes that in general, the plan is realistic, structured, and if properly implemented - a significant improvement on the current mission, however the EUMC has identified deficiencies that might put the whole mission at risk. The EUMC therefore believes that there is a requirement for the following points to be brought into the AU attention.

- The assumption that all parties will comply with the HCFA without taking account of GoS willingness/capability to control armed militias nor the Janjaweed activities seems to be unrealistic;
- The absence of a risk assessment is an essential flaw in the plan;
- Some military tasks could have the potential for mission creep or, at worst, mission failure. Significantly, a number of supporting appendices including ROEs are not included with the document.
- Potentially significant supporting capabilities such as

SATINT and aerial surveillance are not addressed;  
-Command and control arrangements are rigid and do not take account of the need for cross-sector boundary operations and this could limit the capacity for proactive operations and speed of reaction to certain incidents.  
-The arrangements for liaison with the EU, a principal partner, are not satisfactory and need improvement.  
- The plan is lacking mechanism to review the effectiveness of the mission  
-The plan differs significantly from the plan currently being implemented by the AU, that carries a significantly higher level of risk.

14. (C) Against this background, for the support of the AU interest, the EUMC sees an urgent need for the AU to:  
- Establish the DITF in Addis and Force HQ at El Fashir as soon as possible  
-With the framework of the AU ownership, accept international support wherever needed  
-Consider non-AU MILOBS  
-Develop and implement ROEs for this operation consistent with its mandate and international law  
-Accept an EU presence, where the EU deems it necessary, at all levels to increase the situational awareness of one of its principal donors  
-Review its Command and Control structure and be urged to support this by adequate communications and information systems.  
-Implement a pre-deployment training scheme for both MILOBS and Protection Elements. End abridged text.

Schnabel